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Note
NEPA and Scientific Uncertainty:
Using the Precautionary Principle to Bridge the
Gap
Melanie E. Kleiss*
The Earth has spun around the intense energy of the sun
for billions of years, experiencing eras of massive volcanic
eruptions, violent earthquakes, and severe atmospheric
conditions.' Life nonetheless began thriving on this planet two
billion years ago,2 but only during the last 500,000 years have
Homo sapiens enjoyed an earthly dwelling.3 Before the human
population began to grow noticeably, the climatic, biologic, and
geologic conditions of the Earth reached a mild and hospitable
state for humans.4 Today's natural systems provide moderate
weather, generally stable geology, healthy biodiversity, and
overall environmental conditions which allow human existence
and persistence. 5 The Earth is hospitable for people and until
recently has remained quite healthy for humans, despite
human modification and degradation. Human activities in the
last hundred years, however, have begun to erode this
naturally healthful environment and render our surroundings
toxic through pollution and destruction of the Earth's
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. in
Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy Candidate 2004, Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs; B.A. 1998, University of Minnesota-Morris. For
help and comments, I thank Jim Chen, Robert Kudrle, Jennifer L.M. Jacobs,
Amy Salmela, and the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review. I am
also grateful to my family for their continuous support and insight.
1. JONATHAN I. LUNINE, EARTH: EVOLUTION OF A HABITABLE WORLD 115
(1999) (describing the early state of the earth as "very hot and extremely
active, with widespread volcanism").
2. NOEL T. BOAZ, Eco HoMO 13 (1997).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 20-21.
5. See SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE
COMMONs 7-8 (1999).
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protective atmosphere. 6
Congress recognized the vital link between human health
and the environment and passed the unprecedented, far-
reaching National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA)7
to protect the "natural environment."8 NEPA requires a
searching investigation before any federal action that may
affect the environment goes forward. Such an investigation
involves forecasting future impacts and predicting whether an
activity will erode the necessary ecosystems that sustain our
healthy human condition. Predicting environmental impacts
always involves uncertainty, as Aldo Leopold recognized fifty
years ago: "The ordinary citizen today assumes that science
knows what makes the community clock tick; the scientist is
equally sure that he does not. He knows that the biotic
mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully
understood."9
The mix of science and uncertainty baffles legal analysis.
Courts interpret scientific uncertainty in the NEPA context
inconsistently and often defer to agencies' incorrect
interpretations of what constitutes uncertainty. 10  While
commentators have discussed general approaches to dealing
with scientific uncertainty, I I their suggestions are often vague,
qualitative, and never analyzed with particular attention to
NEPA. Because NEPA strives for the laudable goal of human
preservation and, due to its forecasting requirements,
necessarily involves a vast amount of scientific uncertainty,
employing clearly defined and proper methods of resolution is
vital. 12
This Note investigates the issues and ramifications of
scientific uncertainty in NEPA litigation and suggests a
method of resolution that stays true to the policy behind NEPA.
6. BOAZ, supra note 2, at 240-67. "Surviving the environmental
problems of our own making ... will be humankind's immediate
challenge .... " Id. at 267.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370f (2000).
8. Id. § 4331(a).
9. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE 205 (1949).
10. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the
Precautionary Principle, ENVIRONMENT, Sept., 1991, at 4, 4-5, 43 (discussing
the adoption of the precautionary principle).
12. BOAZ, supra note 2, at 243 ("[W]e are not discussing altruistic 'save
the earth' campaigns. We are discussing 'save the earth for us."').
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Part I describes the legislative history, text, and significance of
NEPA and provides an introduction to the precautionary
principle, a recently popular method of resolving scientific
uncertainty. Part II illustrates how NEPA already embodies
the precautionary principle and explains that resolution of
scientific uncertainty can either undermine its precautionary
nature or uphold it. This Note proposes that courts ensure that
agencies correctly identify scientific evidence as "uncertain"
and fully enforce the disclosure of uncertainty requirements of
NEPA's implementing regulations.
This Note also suggests that courts should adopt
procedures that more accurately translate scientific conclusions
into legal conclusions. In particular, courts should lower the
conventional scientific level of certainty from 95% to the
predominant legal standard of preponderance of the evidence
(51%) to ameliorate the intentionally anti-precautionary nature
of the scientific standard and uphold NEPA's goals and policies.
This Note concludes that the adoption of these proposals will
not disturb past holdings that NEPA does not guarantee
substantive results, but rather reinforces and upholds the
policy of NEPA-to give proper pause before further degrading
our precious human environment.
I. NEPA AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE:
HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
When passed in 1970, NEPA stood out as an
unprecedented and forceful statute. 13  Unlike earlier
environmental statutes, NEPA was not confined to a particular
area of environmental regulation, but rather required
comprehensive review and public discourse for any
environmental impacts flowing from a federal action. 14
Furthermore, it was unusually concise 15 and has not endured
repeated or comprehensive amendments like some other
13. LYNTON K. CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 5 (1998); MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A.
SMITH, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL
MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE, & EXECUTIVE NEGLECT 4
(2001).
14. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 22.
15. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000) (statutory text comprising
approximately 16 pages), with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000) (statutory text
comprising approximately 174 pages).
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environmental statutes.1 6 Numerous states have since passed
legislation similar to NEPA. 17  Both NEPA and its
implementing regulations contain implicit requirements for
dealing with uncertainty in environmental impact analyses,
but courts differ in their review of how agencies handle
scientific uncertainty. The precautionary principle speaks
directly to handling uncertainties and may offer guidance on
how to uphold NEPA, our greatest statutory defense against
overall environmental degradation.
A. THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NEPA
Congress passed NEPA in 1969 in response to a need to
protect a healthy environment. 18 The DDT scare 19 and Rachel
Carson's book, Silent Spring,20 served as focusing events,
directing nationwide attention to the consequences of
environmental damage. 21 From 1967 to 1969 almost forty
separate proposals relating to environmental policy and
protection were introduced in Congress. 22 Although Congress
passed other environmental statutes before NEPA, none had
the broad scope and action-forcing 23 mechanisms that NEPA
did, which were considered innovative and revolutionary at
that time.24 Senator Henry Jackson, for example, characterized
16. See Jaime Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal
Environmental Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New
Federalism"?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051, 1058-59 (2001).
17. See, e.g., Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental Duties of Public
Utilities Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 330 (2001) (stating that
as of 1995 nearly twenty states had "mini-NEPAs," their own versions of
NEPA).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (recognizing "the critical importance of restoring
and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of [humans]").
19. DDT, or dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane, was widely used as an
insecticide and later found to be toxic for many organisms, including humans.
See Stephen H. Safe, Endocrine Disrupters: New Toxic Menace?, in EARTH
REPORT 2000, 189, 191-93 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000).
20. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2002) (1962).
21. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 19.
22. CALDWELL, supra note 13, at 28.
23. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (identifying NEPA's action-
forcing procedures as those "which require full and rigorous consideration of
environmental values as an integral part of agency decision making").
24. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 840 (3d ed. 2000) (describing NEPA as adopting an
"unusual strategy" to achieve an "ambitious goal").
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NEPA as "the most important and far-reaching environmental
and conservation measure ever enacted."25  The strong
language of NEPA's policies and its legislative history indicate
that Congress intended both procedural and substantive
obligations to attach to agencies' actions.26
The stated purpose of NEPA remains to cultivate harmony
between people and the environment, to encourage the
prevention or elimination of damage to the environment and
biosphere, and to enhance the understanding of ecological and
natural resource systems. 27  Congress emphasized the
"profound impact" of human activity on "all components" of the
environment, particularly from population growth,
urbanization, industry, resource use, and technological
innovations.2 8 As a result of these human activities, the
dwindling assimilative capacity of the environment to absorb
pollution and adapt to habitat destruction served as a major
incentive for the rigorous analysis requirements of NEPA:
"Today it is clear that we cannot continue to perpetuate the
mistakes of the past. We no longer have the margins for error
and mistake that we once enjoyed."29
To fulfill its stated purposes, some of NEPA's goals are "to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony" and the continuing
responsibility of the government "to use all practicable
means ... to improve and coordinate" government activities. 30
Congress further stated that coordination of the federal
government's activities should enable each generation to serve
as trustee of the environment for the next generation, ensure
safe and healthy surroundings for all Americans, and achieve
25. 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969); see also LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra
note 13, at 5 (quoting Congressman Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), a member of the
House Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment, as saying "the
act is arguably the most important of all environmental legislation").
26. See LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 7 (highlighting statements
of Congress that reflect the intent to prohibit actions that endanger the
existence or health of humans or irreparably harm the air and land). See
generally CALDWELL, supra note 13, at 36-38, 47 (describing the political
climate and public and judicial response to NEPA and arguing that NEPA
contains substantive mandates that have been consistently ignored).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
28. Id. § 4331(a).
29. National Environmental Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 205 (1969) (statement of Senator Henry
M. Jackson).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), (b).
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wide beneficial use of the environment without "undesirable
and unintended consequences."31 Finally, Congress established
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to enforce
NEPA.32 The CEQ implements regulations that have the force
of law and has relative political autonomy to oversee agencies'
compliance with NEPA. 33
B. BASIC PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF NEPA
An agency must comply with NEPA when proposing major
federal action that will significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. 34  For such actions, NEPA requires
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) that
discusses and analyzes the scientific evidence relating to
potential or known environmental impacts of the action.35
When preparing an EIS, an agency must discuss alternatives to
the action, suggest mitigation measures if impacts are likely,
and provide the opportunity for public participation. 36 The EIS
must either conclude that the proposed action or alternative
will not significantly affect the human environment, that
feasible mitigation measures will lessen the impacts to a less-
than-significant level, or that the benefits of the proposal
outweigh the environmental costs, for the proposed action to go
forward. 37 If the agency's findings, determinations, or failure to
fully comply with NEPA procedures are legally challenged, a
court reviews the agency's actions and conclusions under an
arbitrary and capricious standard. 38
31. Id. § 4331(b)(1), (2), (3).
32. Id. §§ 4341-4345.
33. See generally LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 4, 43-44, 65-67
(describing the legislative history, purpose, and statutory authority of the
CEQ).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
35. Id. § 4332(2)(A), (C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2 (2002).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1503, 1506.6, 1508.9.
37. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (holding that an agency has the discretion to find that social, economic,
or other non-environmental benefits of a proposal outweigh the significant
environmental effects); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1505.1-.3 (requiring that agencies
implement procedures to achieve the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332
and implement mitigation established in the EIS).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 377 n.23 (1989) (overruling the lower court's application of a
"reasonableness" standard in favor of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard).
[Vol 87:12151220
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C. THE SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Although scientists may be able to identify some potential
environmental impacts of a proposed activity, future impacts
are almost always uncertain.39 For example, clearing part of a
forest for development clearly reduces the number of trees and
habitat for forest-dwelling organisms, but to what extent those
organisms can adapt to both the loss of habitat and the
increased human presence after completion of the development
is largely unknown. The language of NEPA and its
implementing regulations recognizes the possibility of scientific
uncertainty regarding the environmental impacts of a proposed
project.40 One of NEPA's stated goals is to achieve a wide
range of beneficial uses of the environment without, among
other things, unintended consequences. 41
NEPA implementing regulations previously required
"worst case" analyses when essential information relevant to
adverse impacts was unobtainable, but the CEQ has rescinded
that requirement.42 The "worst case analysis" requirement
meant that where knowledge of impacts was lacking, the
agency must assume the worst possible impacts before
proceeding with overall analysis of the project.43 Perhaps this
requirement proved too cumbersome, since any scientific
forecasting involves uncertainty at some point.44 According to
the Supreme Court, because the CEQ amended the regulations
only after "considerable criticism" of the worst case analysis
requirement, courts should give "substantial deference" to the
new regulations. 45
The amended CEQ regulation still requires full discussion
39. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
("Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to uncertainty.");
Donald A. Brown & Patrick Zaepfel, The Implications of Scientific Uncertainty
for Environmental Law, in SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEM SOLVING 377, 379 (John Lemons ed., 1996); Bodansky, supra note
11, at 5.
40. See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. Neither NEPA nor its
implementing regulations define the terms "uncertain" or "uncertainty."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) (amended 1986).
43. See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
988 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing a worst cases analysis as "weighing the need
for a proposed action against the worst possible consequences of such action").
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356
(1989). See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 903-05 (discussing
the amended worst-case-analysis regulation and concurrent case history).
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of the unobtainable information and a scientifically acceptable
analytical approach. 46 More specifically, when an agency must
deal with "incomplete or unavailable information" relevant to
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts, "the agency
shall always make clear that such information is lacking."47 If
the information is unobtainable due to cost or unknown
scientific methods, the agency must explain in the EIS how
such information is relevant to evaluating reasonably
foreseeable environmental impacts, the existing scientific
evidence which is relevant to evaluating such impacts, and
what impacts may occur based upon generally accepted
theoretical approaches or research methods. 48 Agencies must
also "insure the professional integrity, including scientific
integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental
impact statements."49 In an effectiveness study, the CEQ
identified the lack of quality environmental data as a common
malady in environmental review documents 50 and suggested
that such a failure violates NEPA's mandate to "utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach."51
Scientists often define "scientific uncertainty" as less than
95% confidence that cause and effect have been established.5 2
In contrast, legal findings of fact are often established when the
"weight" of the evidence indicates a particular fact with 51%
confidence or greater. 53  Therefore, when the "weight" of
scientific evidence points to likely environmental consequences,
nine times out of ten a scientist would still call such an
indication "uncertain. '54 This anomaly is troubling because
46. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2002).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1502.22(b).
49. Id. § 1502.24.
50. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 27 (1997).
51. Id. at 25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(A)).
52. Brown & Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 379; see also John Lemons et al.,
The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Type I and Type H
Errors, 2 FOUND. OF SCI. 207, 224, 227 (1997); Peter Montague, The Uses of
Scientific Uncertainty, at http://www.psrast.org/precaut2.htm (last visited Jan.
16, 2003).
53. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1357 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1992) (stating that the "weight of the evidence" standard requires the
party bearing the burden of proof to prove its case to at least fifty-one percent
of the evidence).
54. The calculation for this statement is based on the following: A judge
1222 [Vol 87:1215
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scientific uncertainty plagues environmental impact
predictions for several reasons. First, the complex nature of
the environment involves poorly understood and difficult to
determine interactions. 5 Second, the impacts of interest to a
decision maker are often those that are impossible to quantify,
such as complete loss of a particular area. 56 Third, how and to
what extent development will lead to more development is
difficult to predict. 57 Finally, an EIS requires analyses of
cumulative impacts, which are especially difficult and lead to
persistent uncertainty.5 8  Specifically, in the NEPA
environmental review process, many aspects of both the data
used and the decision made involve uncertainty.5 9 Due to the
reliance on scientific evidence in environmental litigation, the
pervasiveness of uncertainty, and the differing standards for
establishing causation in legal and scientific systems, 60 some
commentators have urged the judiciary to adopt special rules
and procedures for reviewing an agency's handling of scientific
uncertainty.61
would find a fact to be true if the weight of the evidence provided from 51% to
100% confidence, but a scientist asserts scientific certainty only when the
confidence level is from 95% to 100%. Therefore, a scientist would label a
conclusion uncertain while a judge would find the same conclusion true at the
following rate: (95-51)/(100-51) = .90, or nine times out of ten.
55. Larry W. Canter, Scientific Uncertainty and the Environmental
Impact Assessment Process in the United States, in SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING 298, 312-13 (John Lemons ed.,
1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 50, at 28-29
(criticizing agencies for failing to analyze existing information effectively,
resulting in less credible environmental review documents).
59. Canter, supra note 55, at 315-16; see also Lemons et al., supra note 52,
at 209 (identifying sources of uncertainty as including lack of data, limitations
of analytical tools, system complexity, and the need to make value judgments
at all stages of the decision-making process).
60. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing the
difference between scientific certainty and judicial fact finding).
61. See, e.g., DAVID VANDERZWAAG, CEPA AND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE/APPROACH 14 (1994) (urging the legal system to shift the burden of
proof, thereby implementing a "polluter pays" strategy); JOEL TICKNER &
CAROLYN RAFFENSPERGER, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: A
HANDBOOK 4, at http://www.biotech-info.net/handbook.pdf (last visited Jan.
16, 2003) (advocating that those proposing an activity should have to prove
that the activity will not cause "undue harm" to the human or natural
environment).
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D. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION TECHNIQUES OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The precautionary principle generally requires cautionary
measures "even if some cause and effect relationships are not
fully established scientifically."62  Commentators have hotly
debated, however, what qualify as cautionary measures.63 This
section summarizes the generally accepted characteristics of
the precautionary principle, including the rejection of risk
neutrality and precautionary decision-making procedures. The
precautionary principle rejects risk neutrality, which calculates
risk as simply a function of the magnitude and probability of
harm, thereby ignoring most uncertainties. 64 For example, a
risk-neutral person would spend $10,000 to avoid a ten percent
risk of environmental harm valued at $1 million, because the
risk (10%) multiplied by the harm ($1 million) equals $10,000.65
In contrast, a precautionary person would likely spend more
because some or most of the uncertainty in the risk calculation
would be resolved to the advantage of the environment. 66
While some commentators assert that the principle allows
rejection of risk assessment altogether, Daniel Bodansky voices
skepticism that intentional implementation of the
precautionary principle would resolve the inherently difficult
problems of regulating unknown environmental effects. 67 He
repeatedly questions how levels of "acceptability" would be
established: For example, how much evidence of potential
environmental harm is necessary before invoking
62. Joel Tickner & Carolyn Raffensperger, The American View on the
Precautionary Principle, in REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
183, 192 (Tim O'Riordan et al. eds., 2001) (citing Nicholas Ashford et al.,
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle (Jan. 23-25, 1998), at
http://www.greenpeace.org.au/toxics/pdf/wingspread.pdf); see also Lemons et
al., supra note 52, at 210 (defining the precautionary approach as exercising
prevention when "good reason" exists to expect environmental or health risks).
63. See VANDERZWAAG, supra note 61, at 14 (stating that the principle
has been described, at one extreme, as entirely an administrative and
legislative matter or, at the other extreme, as hinging completely on scientific
proof).
64. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. (arguing that the precautionary principle ultimately forces a choice
between risks); see also Carolyn Raffensperger, Using Precaution in a U.S.
Legal Context, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 10 (asserting that the
precautionary principle shifts the focus of regulation from "measuring and
managing risk to finding solutions and preventing harm").
67. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 43.
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precautionary approaches? 68 And, what kind of precautionary
action is warranted and at what cost?69  Unlike most
commentators on the precautionary principle, Bodansky argues
that the principle does not choose caution over risk, but rather
chooses between two risks.70 Bodansky's concerns address
substantive issues of what decision to make, however, whereas
implementation of precautionary procedures merely seeks to
heighten decision makers' awareness and consideration of
possible adverse impacts.
When applied to potentially harmful proposals,
implementation of precautionary procedures operates
differently at the decision-making and judicial review levels. 7'
The decision-making level requires various steps to taking
precaution: describing the environmental threat,72 describing
the scientific certainties and uncertainties, 73 identifying
alternatives to the activity,74 and determining a course of
action based on all considerations and information in the
previous steps.75 In addition, some commentators assert that a
necessary element of the precautionary principle is allowing
the public-especially those who may be affected-to
participate in decisions to better balance information in the
face of scientific uncertainty.76
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 5, 43.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Compare Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5, 43 (discussing the two
general legal techniques of dealing with uncertainty in a courtroom), with
Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10 (outlining the decision-making
precautionary approach), and Montague, supra note 52, at
http://www.psrast.org/precaut2.htm (identifying an approach similar to
Raffensperger's, but with additional steps).
72. This step analyzes direct and indirect impacts, spatial and temporal
extent of impacts, and the significance of impacts. Raffensperger, supra note
66, at 10; see Tickner & Raffensperger, supra note 62, at 204-05.
73. This step ascertains what is known, not yet known but knowable, and
unknowable. Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10; see Tickner &
Raffensperger, supra note 62, at 204-05.
74. This step generates other options to achieve the same basic purpose of
the proposed activity, thereby finding the least environmentally damaging
alternative. Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10; Tickner & Raffensperger,
supra note 62, at 193, 205-06.
75. This step determines the level of precaution necessary and whether to
avoid the activity, use an alternative, impose mitigation measures, or demand
a performance bond. See Tickner & Raffensperger, supra note 62, at 208.
Carolyn Raffensperger only implicitly suggests this step in her approach.
Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10.
76. See Tim O'Riordan et al., The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1215
On the other hand, when a court reviews a decision made
in the face of scientific uncertainty, its options for dealing with
such evidence (or lack thereof) include shifting the burden of
proof77  or filling gaps in knowledge with evidentiary
presumptions.78 If the burden of proof shifts to the party
proposing the potentially harmful activity, that burden can be
anything from an initial showing of unlikely harm to proof of
safety or inertness.79 The justification for shifting the burden
of proof is that "those who have the power, control, and
resources to act and prevent harm should bear that
responsibility. '80
E. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NEPA's MANDATES WHEN
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IS INVOLVED
In the only federal case that mentions both NEPA and the
precautionary principle, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit implied that NEPA contained policies like the
precautionary principle. 81 The Second, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits implicitly invoke the principle by occasionally adopting
mild precautionary approaches when discussing agencies'
handling of scientific uncertainty in NEPA decisions, but
usually give substantial deference to the treatment the agency
in REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 9, 18-19 (Tim O'Riordan
et al. eds., 2001); Tickner & Raffensperger, supra note 62, at 193, 206-07;
Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10 (arguing that the inherent politics behind
determining causality in the face of uncertainty requires public involvement);
Nicholas Ashford et al., Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle
(Jan. 23-25, 1998), at www.greenpeace.org.au/toxics/pdf/wingspread.pdf.
77. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5 (stating that the burden of proof
technique is appropriate only when enough information exists to define a
range of possible environmental effects); O'Riordan et al., supra note 76, at 20;
Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10 (stating that the burden of proof can be
shifted through assigning financial responsibility, requiring the posting of
assurance bonds, or establishing a duty to monitor, inform, and act).
78. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 43 (stating that presumptions are often
used when uncertainties are so severe that they cannot be quantified
meaningfully).
79. See id. at 5. (describing the burden of proof as somewhere between
showing plausible outcomes to proving harmlessness).
80. Raffensperger, supra note 66, at 10.
81. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999)
(stating that courts must exercise extreme caution when applying policies of
NEPA and other U.S. domestic laws to claims under international law, in
response to the argument that the court should apply the precautionary
principle).
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deems appropriate. 82 When granting deference, these courts
often cite the Supreme Court's holding that "NEPA itself does
not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process."83 This holding may be in conflict with CEQ
regulations, which state that "NEPA's purpose is not to
generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster
excellent action."84 Often rejecting the deferential approach,
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits tend to review agency decisions
regarding scientific uncertainty with greater scrutiny, holding
that agencies must take a "hard look" at environmental
consequences. 85
Perhaps demonstrating the greatest deference to an
agency's interpretation of scientific uncertainty, the Seventh
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Marita deferred to the Forest Service's
determination that an entire field of science, conservation
biology, does not produce reliable or applicable evidence. 86
Although the plaintiffs pointed out that "all scientific
propositions are inherently unverifiable and at most
falsifiable,"87 the court nonetheless found that the Forest
Service's acknowledgment and subsequent dismissal of
conservation biological theories sufficed to qualify as taking a
"hard look" at potential environmental impacts.88
82. See, e.g., Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir.
2000) (rejecting a precautionary review of agency guidelines because "[tihe
argument that [an agency] should create greater safety margins in its
guidelines to account for uncertain data is a policy question, not a legal one");
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 623 (7th Cir. 1995) (deferring to the Forest
Service's determination that an entire field of science, conservation biology,
does not produce reliable or applicable evidence and is therefore "uncertain");
Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that so long
as scientific evidence exists to support the EIS analysis, conflicting evidence
does not warrant judicial intervention).
83. See, e.g., Marita, 46 F.3d at 623 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), to support the holding that the
agency need only discuss scientific uncertainties and is under no obligation to
accept or reject them).
84. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2001); see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, supra note 50, at iv, 20, 29 (asserting repeatedly that the goal of
NEPA is to reach a better decision, and not to simply produce documents).
85. See, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722,
733 (9th Cir. 2001); Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 198 F.3d 960, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
86. Marita, 46 F.3d at 623.
87. Id. at 622 (arguing that allowing an agency to ignore theories of
conservation biology because of "uncertainty" would, on the same logic, allow
the agency to ignore the theory of gravity).
88. Id. at 623-24.
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In contrast, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits occasionally show
less deference to agencies by using the "hard look" doctrine 89 or
CEQ regulations to support decisions to remand agencies'
determinations in the face of scientific uncertainty.90 As the
Ninth Circuit held in one NEPA case, "[a]n agency must
generally prepare an EIS if the environmental effects of a
proposed agency action are highly uncertain."91 In other words,
the agency has the burden to show that a proposed action will
not have a significant environmental impact; otherwise the
agency must prepare an EIS.92 If the agency prepares an EIS,
it must fully discuss scientific uncertainty surrounding the
proposed action.93 Further, the EIS may not rest on stale or
incomplete scientific evidence. 94
The Ninth Circuit recently departed from its established
precedent and held in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
United States Department of Transportation that if
environmental damage is "purely speculative," the EIS need
not discuss relevant uncertainties with specificity. 95 The court
held that the EIS prepared by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) adequately discussed the potential
impacts of alien species introduction from the expansion of an
airport 96 because the plaintiffs failed to show specific,
predictable environmental harm where evidence otherwise
remained uncertain.97 As the dissent noted, however, the FAA
discussion of the threat of introduction was "virtually non-
existent,"98 even though the expansion would produce an
89. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (holding that NEPA requires agencies to take a "hard look" at the
environmental impacts of a proposal).
90. See, e.g., Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 730-33; Makua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F.
Supp. 2d 1202, 1216-17 (D. Haw. 2001); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Butler, 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1180, 1188-89 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
91. Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 731.
92. See id.
93. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1993);
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2002).
94. See Seattle Audubon, 998 F.2d at 704.
95. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d
677, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2000).
96. See id. at 682.
97. See id. at 680-81 (holding that the notorious unreliability of airport
demand projections, "purely speculative" environmental damage, and the
failure of the plaintiffs to identify a particular species that would be
introduced constituted high uncertainty).
98. Id. at 687 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also id. at 683-84 (Fletcher, J.,
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increase in yearly arrivals from Asia from 0 to 1100, and such
flights increase the risk of introducing Asian species. 99 Despite
the National Parks decision, the Ninth Circuit's requirements
for compliance with NEPA often reflect precautionary
approaches by generally shifting the burden of proof to the
agency proposing the action and placing emphasis on scientific
uncertainty and reliable evidence. 100
When parties claim that an agency must delay its proposed
action until more or better information can fill in gaps of
scientific uncertainty, courts generally follow the D.C. Circuit's
ruling in Alaska v. Andrus.l0 1 The D.C. Circuit held that NEPA
requires agencies to obtain information concerning
environmental consequences of their actions and that agencies
cannot escape that duty by labeling the analysis of future
environmental effects a "crystal ball inquiry."10 2  Because
NEPA's procedures are meant to ensure careful and informed
decision making, an agency must comply with those duties "to
the fullest extent"10 3 and take a "hard look" at all potential
environmental effects of a proposed project. 10 4  Important
effects will thereby "not be overlooked or underestimated only
to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die
otherwise cast."'0 5
Federal courts are inconsistent in their review of scientific
uncertainty and agency treatment of uncertainty.'0 6 Most
courts give substantial deference to an agency's handling of
dissenting) (asserting that the agency failed to take the requisite "hard look"
at the possible environmental impacts because it never analyzed the forecasts
that predicted a likely impact).
99. Id. at 685 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
100. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
101. 580 F.2d 465, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds
sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 933 (1978); see also
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:20 (2d ed. 2002)
(discussing the holding in Alaska v. Andrus).
102. Andrus, 580 F.2d at 473; see also Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747
F.2d 1240, 1249 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 regulations
clearly contemplates original research if necessary to effect a reasoned choice
among alternatives).
103. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
104. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
105. Id. at 349.
106. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text (describing the different
approaches of the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of
Appeals).
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uncertainty, characterizing such review as "substantive" and
therefore proscribed by Supreme Court jurisprudence. 10 7 The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, often reviews agency
decisions made in the face of scientific uncertainty with greater
scrutiny than the other circuit courts, occasionally finding such
decisions to violate the "hard look" doctrine or CEQ
regulations. 108 Despite these trends, however, inconsistency
predominates even within the circuit courts and exacerbates
the difficulty of reconciling scientific evidence with the vital
policies of NEPA.
II. PROPER NEPA ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES A
PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO TREATMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
By enacting NEPA, Congress required federal agencies to
exercise caution, consider alternatives, and seek public
comments before committing themselves to activities that may
harm the environment. 10 9 In these respects, NEPA represents
a statutory enforcement of the precautionary principle. 110
Because of the nature of environmental impact assessment and
ecological prediction, scientific uncertainty plagues the
environmental analyses required under NEPA.II To uphold
the inherent precautionary nature of NEPA, agencies should
meaningfully consider and disclose such uncertainties. 12
Likewise, courts should ensure that agencies do so, through
fully enforcing NEPA's implementing regulations that require
the disclosure of incomplete or unavailable information. 113
Further, courts should recognize and mitigate the inherent
reluctance of scientists to find correlations between human
activities and environmental impacts.1 14 With these methods,
courts will better serve congressional intent and inch ever
107. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
109. See supra Part IA-B.
110. See supra Part IA-B.
111. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
113. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2002); see also supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text (discussing CEQ regulations for incomplete or unavailable
information).
114. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 217-18 (asserting that the
pervasive uncertainty inherent in complex environmental issues precludes
finding cause and effect relationships, and that classical science thereby leads
to conclusions of negligible impacts).
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closer to the goal of harmonizing human activities with a
healthy environment.
A. CONGRESS CREATED STATUTORY PRECAUTION THROUGH
NEPA
As some commentators have noted without detailed
explanation, NEPA's policies, goals, and requirements embody
a precautionary approach to decisions that may affect the
environment. 115 Although the precise definition of the
precautionary principle escapes consensus, 1 6 the principle
generally requires cautionary measures "even if some cause
and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically."1 7 This generally accepted definition especially
resonates in NEPA's stated policy of preventing or eliminating
environmental damage, 118 its recognition of humankind's
profound and multi-faceted impact on the environment,' 9 and
its policy of avoiding unintended consequences. 120 When faced
with scientific uncertainty regarding possible future impacts,
any of these concepts counsel in favor of selecting a safer
alternative or postponing the proposed project-in other words,
taking precaution. 121 In addition, NEPA's far-reaching goals,
115. See Tickner & Raffensperger, supra note 62, at 187-88 (asserting that
NEPA implicitly contains the precautionary principle through establishing
goals for environmental protection, a right to a healthful environment, and a
responsibility for agencies to comprehensively study impacts of and
alternatives to proposed projects); see also CALDWELL, supra note 13, at 78 ("A
major purpose of the Act was to integrate environmental values into Federal
policies and programs .... "); Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5 ("Although
environmentalists often assume that the precautionary principle is a new idea,
it has been for many years the basis of much U.S. domestic environmental
legislation.").
116. See, e.g., Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 235 (stating that no precise
agreement exists as to what the precautionary principle entails); see also
supra Part I.D (discussing the definition and application of the precautionary
principle).
117. Nicholas Ashford et al., Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary
Principle (Jan. 23-25, 1998), at http://www.greenpeace.org.au/toxics/pdf/
wingspread.pdf; see also Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 210 (defining the
precautionary approach as exercising prevention when "good reason" exists to
expect environmental or health risks).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
119. Id. § 4331(a).
120. Id. § 4331(b)(3); see generally supra notes 26-31 and accompanying
text.
121. See generally supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that cited purposes of NEPA ultimately prescribe
environmental precautions).
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comprehensive analysis requirements, emphasis on
alternatives, 122  and public notice requirements strongly
resemble the generally accepted approach to implementing
precaution at the decision-making level: describe the
environmental threat, describe the scientific certainties and
uncertainties, identify alternatives, and allow public
participation. 123
NEPA's rigorous analytical requirements also seem to
focus equally on what is known and what is not known,
suggesting that scientific uncertainty should not receive
neutral treatment or remain ignored. Specifically, NEPA and
its implementing regulations require full discussion and
disclosure of a proposed project's impacts, 124 the methods used
to analyze the impacts, 125  and, most importantly, any
incomplete or unavailable information relevant to reasonably
foreseeable significant adverse impacts. 126  Indeed, during
Senate deliberations on NEPA, Senator Jackson argued that
agencies should err on the side of environmental protection
when conflicts arise in the decision-making process, 127 and that
we can no longer tolerate margins for error and mistake. 128
Such statements advocate precaution and imply that persistent
scientific questions should not be ignored or treated neutrally,
but rather should lead toward the assumption that negative
impacts could occur. Finally, Supreme Court jurisprudence
also appears to recognize the precautionary nature of NEPA's
procedural mandates, emphasizing that NEPA protects against
realizing harmful environmental impacts too late. 129
122. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (requiring an analysis of alternatives for every
proposed action involving unresolved conflicts, regardless of whether the
action will significantly impact the environment); see, e.g., Davis v. Mineta,
302 F.3d 1104, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the two alternatives
considered in the Environmental Assessment (EA) did not sufficiently analyze
available alternatives for the proposed highway construction project).
123. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
124. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2002) (the EIS "shall provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts").
125. Id. § 1502.24 (agencies must identify the methodologies used and
make reference to sources relied upon).
126. Id. § 1502.22.
127. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 78; see also supra notes 28-31
and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of NEPA that
indicates an intent that environmental issues be resolved in favor of
protection).
128. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
129. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
1232 [Vol 87:1215
2003] NEPA AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
B. DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IS VITAL TO THE GOALS,
POLICIES, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NEPA
The strong precautionary elements of NEPA's legislative
history and text suggest that Congress foresaw the necessity
and importance of dealing with scientific uncertainty in the
EA/EIS process. 130 Indeed, the failure to recognize, disclose,
and discuss uncertainty undermines the processes essential to
NEPA: public participation, identification and acceptance of
better alternatives, and overall policies and goals.' 31 Such
avoidance and rejection of scientific uncertainty as a tool
effectively "derail[s] preventive policy from being drafted." 32 If
every impact were certain, the best alternative would be clear,
and public participation would only serve to illuminate social,
not environmental, issues. Furthermore, because uncertain
environmental impacts both plague almost every
environmental review document and serve as the key to
upholding the purpose and goals of NEPA, courts and policy
makers alike should pay greater attention to the inherent
biases in scientific uncertainty. Not only does the scientific
method operate to preclude precautionary measures, but
administrative processes by their nature also tend to be anti-
precautionary. 133  These potential blows to the important
purposes of NEPA call for a searching investigation and
understanding of why and how science undermines the
precautionary nature of NEPA and an invocation of methods to
counteract or mitigate such tendencies.
An inherently precautionary environmental statute like
NEPA naturally leads to scarce, uncertain, or conflicting
evidence because the statute pushes scientific knowledge to its
current boundaries. 134 The drafters of NEPA recognized the
limitations of classical science and therefore included a
requirement to consider the social sciences as well. 135 While
(1989); see also supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA
procedures).
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (describing these
processes as precautionary procedures intended to cope with uncertainty).
132. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 55.
133. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 228.
134. See id.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (2000); CALDWELL, supra note 13, at 56-57; see
also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.6 (2002) (requiring EIS preparation to use an
interdisciplinary approach).
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social science methods might mitigate some of the uncertainty
of classical science in certain situations, NEPA's implementing
regulations primarily focus on the scientific analyses of
environmental impacts. 36 Classical science nonetheless serves
a useful analytic purpose, so long as its limitations and biases
are properly recognized and handled. 137
From the scientific perspective, asserting or claiming a
possible environmental impact is akin to adding to the body of
collective scientific knowledge; showing connections and
relationships between actions and results, or cause and effect
relationships, augments the existing body of knowledge. 38 To
maintain the most accurate and dependable body of knowledge,
the scientific method naturally requires a high threshold of
evidence before a researcher can claim a cause and effect
relationship. 139 The generally accepted confidence level of 95%
means that there must be only a one in twenty chance that a
cause and effect relationship does not exist for a researcher to
claim that the data support such a relationship.140 Conversely,
conventional practice allows a larger margin of error for
rejecting a cause and effect relationship when it in fact exists-
up to a one in five chance, or four times as often as mistakenly
accepting a non-existent cause and effect relationship.1 41
These two types of scientific error are called "type I" and
"type II" errors.1 42 Most scientists consistently hold type I error
(the chance of claiming a cause and effect relationship when it
in fact does not exist) down to 5%, and let type II error (the
chance of rejecting a cause and effect relationship when it in
fact does exist) fluctuate between 5% and 20%.143 Type II error
can fluctuate beyond 20%, however, thereby incurring an even
greater risk of claiming that no adverse environmental impact
136. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1-.25 (concentrating primarily on how
to use classical scientific evidence in an EIS, and devoting only one small
paragraph to addressing interdisciplinary evidence).
137. See CALDWELL, supra note 13, at 57 (stating that science usefully tests
underlying assumptions, but scientific conclusions become questionable when
the underlying assumptions can be disproved or revealed as biased).
138. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 214-15.
139. See id. at 227; see also Brown & Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 384 (stating
that regulation should not occur without a high level of scientific certainty).
140. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 224.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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will occur when in fact it will. 144 Because environmental
impacts often involve numerous and complex interactions, type
II error increases and, using the classical 95% rule, "increases
the likelihood that serious future consequences are
overlooked." 145 Therefore, in the environmental sciences, the
scientific process puts a higher burden of proof on those
claiming that an adverse impact may occur. In other words,
the scientific 95% rule for labeling causal relationships
"certain" operates to discourage precautionary conclusions. 146
While this approach effectively serves the interests of science,
it cuts against the precautionary policy of NEPA and conflicts
with the traditional legal standard of 51%. 147
C. COURTS SHOULD ENFORCE AGENCIES' RESPONSIBILITIES TO
ADDRESS UNCERTAINTY
An increasingly pervasive and disturbing trend among
some federal circuits is giving undue deference to agency
methods and procedures of decision making during the EA and
EIS process, 148 despite implementing regulations that contain
rigorous discussion and disclosure requirements. 149 To enforce
the precautionary purposes of NEPA, courts must, at a
minimum, diligently enforce those regulations dictating how
agencies must handle scientific information and lack thereof.
Because the scientific method itself discourages precautionary
conclusions, 150 courts should also adopt specialized procedures
for the admission and handling of scientific evidence. In
particular, this Note recommends classifying scientific evidence
as "certain" if it satisfies traditional legal standards of proof,
even when classical scientific standards of proof would label
such evidence "inconclusive."15'
144. See id. at 225-27.
145. Id. at 217.
146. See id. at 217-18, 228.
147. See id. at 228; supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing
the difference between scientific uncertainty and legal findings). See generally
Brown & Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 379-87 (discussing scientific evidence in
legal proceedings).
148. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text; see also Brown &
Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 387 (discussing court deference to agency
experience).
149. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
151. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 231-35 (suggesting a similar
approach at the decision-making stage).
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1. Courts Must Ensure that Agencies Correctly Label
Evidence as "Uncertain" and Adequately Discuss Such
Evidence
Courts must remain mindful of the scientific definition of
"uncertainty"152 and ensure that agencies do not mislabel
otherwise valid information. Such mislabeling has the same
effect as an attempt to evade information gathering by claiming
that the analysis of future environmental effects would be
"crystal ball inquiry."153 Because the scientific threshold for
establishing a causal relationship already rests at the 95%
level of confidence, a very high level for a field as complex as
environmental science, agencies must treat scientific evidence
that meets this high burden seriously. 154 Only if the scientific
conclusions themselves establish indirect or minimal causal
relationships, or are lacking altogether, should a court allow an
agency to conclude that significant impacts are "uncertain."
The CEQ regulations imply that only incomplete or
unobtainable information constitutes uncertain evidence
because an agency may exclude only such information from its
environmental impacts analysis. 155
A particularly severe example of inappropriate deference to
an agency's characterization of scientific evidence as
"uncertain" is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v.
Marita.156 The Marita court deferred to the Forest Service's
acknowledgement and dismissal of an entire field of science,
conservation biology.' 57 The court held that the Service took a
"hard look" at evidence from the field of conservation biology, 158
even though the Service did not include the evidence within a
significant impacts analysis.159 Amici correctly pointed out that
152. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
153. See Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in
part on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S.
933 (1978) (citing Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see also supra notes 101-02
and accompanying text (discussing agency requirements).
154. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (describing the
conventional scientific level of confidence of 95% and the difficulty of obtaining
such a level of certainty in the environmental sciences).
155. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2002) (permitting the exclusion of relevant
but incomplete or unobtainable information).
156. 46 F.3d 606, 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
157. Id.; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
158. Marita, 46 F.3d at 623-24.
159. Id. at 622-23.
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merely because any scientific proposition is "inherently
unverifiable and at most falsifiable" does not mean that the
Service can simply choose which propositions to analyze,
writing off the rest as "uncertain." 60 Amici argued that an
agency could thereby ignore the theory of gravity if it so
wished. 61  Nonetheless, the court credited the Service's
justification for ignoring such evidence-that conflicting
scientific evidence existed regarding the need to provide large
areas of old growth habitat. 162 Conflicting evidence, however,
does not qualify as "uncertain" unless it fails to meet the 95%
level of certainty 163 and does not excuse an agency from
studying scientifically valid theories that suggest that a
significant impact may occur. 164 As Marita demonstrates,
courts should ensure that an agency correctly characterizes
"uncertainty" before deferring to that agency's failure to fully
analyze scientific evidence.
The regulations promulgated by the CEQ under its NEPA
authority already substantially uphold the precautionary
purposes of NEPA. The CEQ intended its implementing
regulations to prescribe procedures that would foster good
decision making. 65 Because courts cannot review an agency's
ultimate decision whether or not to proceed with a proposal, 66
fully enforcing the underlying procedural mandates is vital to
giving NEPA any of its intended effect. 167 Some courts have
ignored the CEQ requirements of acknowledging and
discussing uncertain information. In National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. United States Department of
Transportation,168 the Ninth Circuit held that the EIS prepared
by the FAA adequately discussed the potential impacts of alien
160. Id. at 622.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 623.
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (defining "scientific
uncertainty" as less than a 95% level of certainty).
164. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2002) (requiring the agency to acquire
information "essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives" if costs of
obtaining the information "are not exorbitant").
165. See id. § 1500.1(c) (stating that "NEPA's purpose is to... foster
excellent action"); see also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
166. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.").
167. See id. at 350 (stating that "[tihe sweeping policy goals announced in
§ 101 of NEPA are thus realized through a set of 'action-forcing' procedures").
168. 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000).
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species introduction from the expansion of an airport and did
not arbitrarily or capriciously conclude that the threat of
introduction was insignificant. 169 The court found that the
notorious unreliability of airport demand projections, "purely
speculative" environmental damage, and failure of the
plaintiffs to identify a particular species that would be
introduced constituted high scientific uncertainty. 170 The court
further found that the detailed mitigation plan within the EIS
adequately addressed the potential impacts.1 71 As the dissent
noted, however, the FAA discussion of the threat of
introduction was "virtually non-existent." 172 At the very least,
the FAA should have included a detailed statement within the
EIS addressing the incomplete or unobtainable information
relating to foreign species introduction, as required by NEPA's
implementing regulations. 173
2. Courts Should Translate the Scientific Standard Governing
Causal Relationships to a Legal Standard to Uphold NEPA's
Precautionary Nature
Some commentators argue that the precautionary principle
cannot effectively serve as a standard of review due to its
vagueness. 174  One need not agree on an across-the-board
definition of the principle to promote effective procedures,
however, but rather need only promote greater precaution or
less anti-precaution to serve the particular goal at issue. 175 For
example, many commentators suggest implementing the
precautionary principle by shifting the burden of proof to
proponents of potentially harmful activities, requiring them to
show that the activities will not cause harm. 176 While such a
169. Id. at 682.
170. Id. at 680-81.
171. See id. at 681 (concluding that "mitigation measures included in the
EIS are sufficient to satisfy NEPA").
172. Id. at 687 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
173. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2002).
174. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that "the precautionary
principle ... is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard"); see also Lemons
et al., supra note 52, at 210 (asserting that no definition of the precautionary
principle is "concrete enough" to allow for implementation).
175. See generally Elizabeth Fisher, Is the Precautionary Principle
Justiciable?, 13 J. ENVTL. L. 315, 321-34 (2001) (describing effective judicial
applications of the precautionary principle).
176. Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5 (acknowledging the existence of
versions of the precautionary principle that "go to the opposite extreme by
reversing the burden of proof'); see, e.g., Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 230
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remedy might eliminate risk to the public health, such a large
burden on a proponent of any major federal action subject to
NEPA would likely halt all or most development and receive
significant criticism. 177  On the other hand, a number of
characteristics of challenges under NEPA suggest that lowering
the scientific standard of 95%, rather than actually shifting the
burden of proof, would better serve the precautionary approach.
First, courts are already required to determine whether an
agency took a "hard look" at scientific evidence in challenges
under NEPA.178 Second, the contested scientific conclusions
often if not always determine whether the agency concludes
that a significant environmental impact will occur. 179 NEPA
mandates such reliance by requiring that agencies rely on
scientific evidence by utilizing "a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural
and social sciences" when planning and making decisions that
may have an impact on the environment.1 80 Finally, courts are
increasingly able to deal with and understand scientific
evidence due to the increasing use of science in the
courtroom. 181
While members of the scientific community might balk at
such a suggestion if they view it as a threat to the scientific
method itself, courts should treat relevant scientific evidence
that shows a likely adverse impact at 51% or higher as
warranting consideration in an environmental review
(listing reasons in favor of reversing the burden of proof); Raffensperger, supra
note 66, at 10 (stating that the burden should be reversed, and placed on
"those who have the power, control, and resources to act and to prevent
harm").
177. See VANDERZWAAG, supra note 61, at 14 (stating that to demand a
showing of absolute harmlessness "would be asking the scientifically
impossible"); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 10791 (2001) (observing that applying the "extreme"
prospect of reversing the burden of proof to the past would have prevented the
existence of important technology like electricity); Bodansky, supra note 11, at
5 (asserting that viewing every activity with suspicion would be impractical).
178. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989); see supra note 89.
179. See LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 54-55 (suggesting that
agencies use science to legitimize their ultimate conclusions); CALDWELL,
supra note 13, at 58 ("In our society, a traditional role of science in relation to
political policy has been to serve-not to question.").
180. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (2000).
181. Michael Freeman, Law and Science: Science and Law, in SCIENCE IN
COURT 1 (Michael Freeman & Helen Reece eds., 1998) ("Law has always
sought the assistance of scientists, though never more so than today.").
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document. 82 In other words, evidence should not be limited to
the much higher level of proof used in the scientific method
(95%), but rather should conform to the traditional legal
standard of preponderance of the evidence.' 83 This will not
conflict with the Supreme Court's Daubert standards, which
govern the admission of scientific evidence in court and must
focus "solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."184 Therefore, whether a study
passes the Daubert test depends upon the experimental and
data collection methods, and not the statistical level of
confidence chosen.] 85
Although a level even lower than 51% might better serve
precautionary goals, and any level below 95% could be justified
as "more precautionary," a number of reasons justify setting
the threshold at 51%. First, the legal community understands
a 51% level of proof because it matches the common legal
standard of "preponderance of the evidence." Second, unlike a
lower threshold, a 51% level does not require different
courtroom procedures because the burden of proof will remain
with those alleging significant environmental impacts. Third,
unlike a higher threshold, a 51% level attains the highest level
of precaution without shifting the burden of proof. Fourth, a
51% level avoids most criticisms of applying the precautionary
principle because it prescribes a precise level rather than
vaguely calling for a shift in the burden of proof. 86 Finally, as
a purely procedural modification, lowering the level of certainty
to 51% does not require substantive review by the courts of
agency decisions whether or not to proceed with activities that
182. Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 235 (emphasizing that "whether
scientists involved in public policy-oriented research should be committed to
the 95 percent rule is a normative or policy question, not a scientific one").
183. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 229-30 ("There is no overriding or
prima facie reason for using the 95 percent rule.").
184. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). The
Daubert test consists of a four pronged analysis to determine whether evidence
is relevant and reliable: (1) the scientific methods must be testable and
capable of being shown to be false; (2) publication and peer review of the
scientific methods strengthens admissibility; (3) the methods have a known
and low error rate; and (4) the methods are generally accepted within the
scientific community. Id. at 593-94.
185. But see Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 229 (arguing that the Daubert
analysis effectively excludes "evidence that establishes a reasonable basis for
concern about harm but does not conclusively establish causation").
186. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 11, at 5 (criticizing the precautionary
principle as being "too vague to serve as a regulatory standard").
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may have an adverse impact on the environment.1 87
Using a lower level of certainty in the courtroom need not
affect the traditional scientific method outside the courtroom,
but rather will only require agencies to seriously acknowledge a
greater number of potential environmental impacts. A
different standard would not require any additional
mathematical calculations because the same statistical test
yields a numerical value that can be compared to a 95% level of
confidence, a 51% level, or any level chosen.188 The lower
standard would require agencies to consider and analyze
impacts that are otherwise less certain under stricter scientific
conventions, thereby better serving NEPA's precautionary
goals. In particular, while NEPA requires analyses for the
purpose of speculation, the 95% rule operates to prevent
speculation; 8 9 lowering the threshold will enhance the
speculative process, thereby allowing courts to uphold NEPA's
protective intentions. Not only will the lower standard of 51%
coexist smoothly with present legal procedures, but it will also
enable more effective enforcement and implementation of
NEPA's precautionary elements. 90
Application of a 51% rule to the evidence at issue in the
Ninth Circuit case, National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
United States Department of Transportation,191 might have
rendered the threat of introduced species a likely significant
impact of the proposed airport expansion. 192 More specifically,
if the likelihood of importing foreign species that would
significantly effect the environment rested between 51% and
95%, then applying the 51% rule in lieu of the conventional
187. See infra Part II.D.
188. See DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRACTICE OF STATISTICs 452 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the P-value, a statistical
value which can be measured to determine the strength of evidence for a given
outcome).
189. Brown & Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 379 (explaining how the 95%
confidence rule "implements the social norm that science should not draw false
conclusions or speculate").
190. See Lemons et al., supra note 52, at 229 ("[Llegal rules on the use of
scientific evidence in court proceedings may determine when laws that might
be used to protect human and ecosystemic health may be enforced or
implemented.").
191. 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000).
192. See id. at 685 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (noting that the proposed
project would "produce an increase in the yearly non-stop arrivals from Asia
from 0 to 1,100," and that such flights increase the risk of introducing Asian
species).
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95% rule would reclassify such evidence as a "likely
environmental impact."193 In that scenario, the court would
have to remand and require the FAA to take a "hard look" at
such evidence.1 94 By requiring a more searching investigation
of potential impacts, such a result in National Parks would
have furthered the informed decision-making and action-
forcing processes of NEPA. 195
The implementation of the above recommendations-
vigilant enforcement of NEPA's implementing regulations and
a lowering of the scientific standard for determining whether
an agency must consider scientific evidence-will result in a
broader investigation of possible impacts. In particular,
enforcing the regulations will lead to greater attention to cause
and effect relationships that are possible but do not meet the
conventionally strict level of proof in the scientific community.
Furthermore, enforcement will ensure that agencies correctly
label evidence as "uncertain." The resulting emphasis on
possible adverse environmental impacts is exactly what NEPA
intended. 196
D. A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH EMBODIES PROCEDURAL
REVIEW
Whether Congress intended NEPA to require substantive
results has been hotly debated since its passage in 1970.197
Early judicial opinions, particularly the D.C. Circuit decision in
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic
Energy Commission,198  arguably opened the door to a
substantive review component of NEPA. 199 The Supreme Court
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
194. Compare 222 F.3d at 683 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
FAA should take a "hard look"), with id. at 682 (majority opinion responding
that the data are too speculative to require such an investigation).
195. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (holding that the action-forcing mechanisms that require agencies to
take a hard look at potential environmental impacts uphold the broad policy
goals of NEPA).
196. See supra Part II.A (explaining how NEPA's policies, goals, and
requirements embody a precautionary approach towards projects with possibly
adverse environmental impacts).
197. See, e.g., LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 10 (stating that by
not enforcing the substantive values of NEPA, courts seriously undermine
congressional intent).
198. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
199. Id. at 1115 (holding that "[tihe reviewing courts probably cannot
reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be
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has repeatedly held since then, however, that NEPA confers
only procedural rights, and courts may not review the decision
of an agency to go forward with a project if the agency has
complied with all procedural requirements of NEPA.200 While
the issue of substantive review under NEPA remains an
interesting topic,20 1 it does not affect the subject of this Note;
reviewing scientific uncertainty as recommended in Part ILC
will involve only procedural review.20 2 Therefore, courts should
not decline to review decisions regarding scientific uncertainty
solely on the grounds that any such review would involve
substantive issues.203
shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.").
Compare THOMAS R. LUNDQUIST, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL IN THE
NEPA CONTEXT: SUGGESTED DEFINITIONS AND SOME FURTHER THOUGHT 14
(1975) (observing that most circuit courts agree that NEPA creates
substantive rights), with LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 116-17
(explaining how federal courts had consistently upheld all of NEPA's policies,
substantive and procedural, before the Supreme Court limited judicial review
to only procedural compliance), and PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 850
(suggesting that the Supreme Court in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam), rejected the D.C.
Circuit's holding on substantive review in Calvert Cliffs).
200. "[Ilt is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular
results, but simply prescribes the necessary process." Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (citing Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per
curiam), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)); see supra note 83 and accompanying
text (observing that NEPA "does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process").
201. See, e.g., LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 13, at 113-20 (describing
the judicial history of substantive review under NEPA and arguing that recent
Supreme Court decisions have mistakenly allowed only procedural review).
NEPA's implementing regulations also emphasize that NEPA's purpose is to
produce better environmental decisions, and not just better paperwork.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2002).
202. See Lynda M. Warren, Using Law to Define Uncertain Science in
Environmental Policy, in SCIENCE IN COURT 183 (Michael Freeman & Helen
Reece eds., 1998) (describing the treatment of scientific uncertainty in the
courtroom and asserting that "[a]dopting the precautionary principle is not a
scientific approach but a procedural change"); see also Fisher, supra note 175,
at 328 (explaining that problems of judicial competence in applying the
precautionary principle have been overcome "where the principle has been
construed as a principle of procedural fairness").
203. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit
court viewpoints on the precautionary approach and deference to agency
interpretations); see also Brown & Zaepfel, supra note 39, at 387 (stating that
otherwise courts defer to agencies based on grounds of expertise, rather than
on a recognition that agencies have given appropriate weight or attention to
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The first recommendation of this Note-fully enforcing the
CEQ regulations-remains entirely within the realm of
procedural review because the regulations state that they
implement procedural requirements 20 4 and do not require a
particular outcome or decision based upon the discussion of
lacking information,2 5 and federal courts have enforced the
regulations without noting issues of substantive review. 20 6 The
second recommendation of this Note-lowering the standard of
admitting scientific evidence to 51%-also does not involve
substantive issues because courts still will refrain from
reviewing the agency's ultimate decision. The only difference
in the courtroom will be that the court may have more evidence
of cause and effect relationships against which to gauge
whether the agency fully analyzed those relationships.
CONCLUSION
The dominant judicial trend of deferring to an agency's
treatment of scientific uncertainty threatens the important
goals Congress codified in NEPA. In particular, ignoring the
unproven yet potential negative environmental impacts of a
proposed agency action undermines the precautionary nature of
NEPA, as evidenced by its requirements of public participation,
consideration of alternatives, full discussion and disclosure of
scientific analyses, and stated policies and goals. As the most
demanding and broad piece of federal environmental
legislation, NEPA should be carefully and fully enforced to best
ensure a healthy environment for future generations.
The precautionary treatment of scientific uncertainty can
be upheld in two ways. First, courts should diligently enforce
NEPA's implementing regulations that require identification
and discussion of incomplete and unavailable information. If
uncertain scientific evidence).
204. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 ("Parts 1500 through 1508 of this title provide
regulations applicable to and binding on all Federal agencies for implementing
the procedural provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act ......
(emphasis added)).
205. See id. § 1500.2 (outlining the overall responsibility of agencies and
making only a general call to "restore and enhance the quality of the human
environment" after all relevant policy considerations).
206. See, e.g., Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding adequate the EIS submitted by the Forest Service
regarding a proposed expansion of a ski area within a natural forest); Sierra
Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the Forest
Service properly followed NEPA procedural requirements).
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agencies meet this duty of disclosure, the public participation,
alternatives, and overall analysis procedures will have more
meaning and context. Moreover, if courts ensure that agencies
correctly label evidence as "uncertain," then the analysis
procedures will properly address all likely environmental
impacts. NEPA's goal of informed decision making will thereby
be enhanced. Second, the high scientific proof of causation
requirement of 95% should be brought down to the traditional
legal standard of causation by a preponderance of the evidence,
or 51%, for purposes of requiring full analysis of impacts in an
EIS. This adjustment will not only harmonize scientific and
legal standards for establishing causation, but will also
mitigate the inherent reluctance of scientists to acknowledge
cause and effect relationships. A natural bias of the scientific
method against acknowledging possible negative impacts will
thereby be removed.
If the 51% rule advocated in this Note proves effective, it
may also prove useful in application to other environmental
statutes that promote precaution. This different scientific
norm will uphold NEPA's precautionary and predictive
requirements, effectuate NEPA's broad application to
important environmental protection, and justify a heightened
disclosure of scientific evidence. With the 51% rule and the
diligent enforcement of NEPA's implementing regulations,
courts can more meaningfully and accurately review agency
decisions pursuant to NEPA, and our vital human environment
will be better preserved.
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